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I
n 1971, Christopher D. Stone posed the ques-
tion first to his students and then to a wider 
audience, “Should trees have standing?”1 Al-
though Stone’s question initially was meant 
only to engage the students in his property 
law course, Justice William O. Douglas brought 
the question into the environmental law dis-
course when he cited Stone’s article in the dis-
sent in Sierra Club v. Morton:2
The critical question of “standing” would be 
simplified and also put neatly in focus if we fash-
ioned a federal rule that allowed environmental 
issues to be litigated before federal agencies or 
federal courts in the name of the inanimate 
object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded 
by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the 
subject of public outrage. Contemporary public 
concern for protecting nature’s ecological equi-
librium should lead to the conferral of standing 
upon environmental objects to sue for their own 
preservation.3
Stone wanted his students to consider changing 
societal values regarding what was ownable, who 
could own things, and the rights and duties asso-
ciated with ownership—his point was that legal 
developments fuel shifts in societal consciousness 
and morality.4 When his students grew bored, he 
asked them to ponder what the social conscious-
ness would look like if nature had rights.5
More than 40 years later, modern legal dis-
course still struggles with this question, and 
now the related one that is particularly relevant 
here—what would it look like if animals had 
rights?6 Animals are protected as part of the envi-
ronment by statutes like the Endangered Species 
1. Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? and 
Other Essays on Law, Morals, and the Environment (25th 
anniversary ed. 1996).
2. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 742 (1972).
3. Id. at 741-42 (1972) (citing Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees 
Have Standing: Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 450 (1971)).
4. Stone, supra note 1, at vii-viii.
5. Id. at viii.
6. There is a debate among scholars and jurists regarding whether 
animals have rights. One of the key points of Stone’s original 
article was that natural objects did not have standing, but should. 
Stone, supra note 1. On the other side of the argument, the court 
in Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush simply stated without discussion that 
animals have rights protected by federal and state laws, including 
criminal statutes. 386 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004). Cass 
Sunstein also observed that federal animal welfare statutes create 
“an incipient bill of rights for animals.” Cass R. Sunstein, Stand-
ing for Animals (With Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. Rev. 
1333, 1334 (2000).
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Act (ESA)7 and Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(MMPA).8 They are also protected in their own 
right by statutes like the Animal Welfare Act.9 
Nevertheless, courts struggle with the practicali-
ties of these questions at the same time society 
struggles with their moral implications.
Perhaps the more relevant question is not 
should trees have standing, but do trees—or non-
human animals10—have standing? Despite a few 
cases that have stated otherwise,11 animals do 
not have standing in U.S. courts to enforce their 
rights or even challenge actions that may injure 
them or already have injured them. In limited 
circumstances, people, either on their own or 
through organizations, have standing to protect 
the interests of animals, 
but that is far from 
guaranteed.
This chapter explores 
the nuances in the devel-
opment of environmen-
tal standing, looking 
especially at the cases 
that can inform animal 
law. Because animals 
are part of the natural 
environment and some 
statutes protecting 
animals, like the ESA 
and MMPA, are often 
characterized as envi-
ronmental law statutes, 
several of the critical 
cases are already ani-
mal law cases, includ-
ing the fundamental case of Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife.12 For the purposes of understanding the 
development of standing for natural objects, Part 
I examines these cases in addition to traditional 
7. 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544.
8. Id. §§1361-1423h.
9. 7 U.S.C. §§2131-2159.
10. Throughout this chapter, the term “animals” means nonhuman 
animals.
11. Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 
(9th Cir. 1988) (“As an endangered species under the Endangered 
Species Act (“Act”) . . . the bird (Loxioides bailleui), a member of 
the Hawaiian honeycreeper family, also has legal status and wings 
its way into federal court as a plaintiff in its own right.”); Marbled 
Murrelet (Brachyramphus marmoratus) v. Pacific Lumber Co., 
880 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Loggerhead Turtle 
v. County Council of Volusia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170 (M.D. 
Fla. 1995). See also Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1359.
12. Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
environmental standing cases. Part II addresses 
the lessons learned from those cases with an eye 
toward increasing the success of standing argu-
ments in the future. Part III discusses where the 
jurisprudence of animal law standing will likely 
diverge from environmental law in the future—
the developing idea that as sentient beings, ani-
mals should have some sort of legal personhood 
status and thereby standing in their own right.
Standing Jurisprudence
“Standing” ensures that courts consider only 
actual “cases and controversies,” as required by 
Article III.13 In Lujan, the Court succinctly sum-
marized the require-
ments of Article III 
standing: (1) the plain-
tiff must have suffered 
an injury that is con-
crete and particularized 
and is actual or immi-
nent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical; (2) the 
injury must be fairly 
traceable to the defen-
dant’s action; and (3) it 
must be likely, instead 
of speculative, that the 
injury will be redressed 
by a favorable decision 
by the court.14 At their 
most basic, then, the 
elements of standing 
are injury, causation, 
and redressability, but courts have demanded 
much more of each element.
Injury
The injury element is the most problematic for environ-
mental plaintiffs. The irony of environmental standing 
is that potential or actual injury to the environment 
only matters to the extent that a person is harmed by 
the damage. Going back to the constitutional “con-
troversy” language, the requirement that the plaintiff 
have a “personal stake” in the outcome ensures the 
adverseness necessary for resolution in court.15 It is 
13. Id. at 559-60.
14. Id. at 560-61.
15. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972).
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not sufficient that the plaintiff is just interested in 
environmental protection; some concrete interest 
of the plaintiff must be at stake.16
It is this requirement that the injury be “con-
crete and particularized” that is a particularly 
high bar for plaintiffs in environmental cases. 
Although the environmental damage may be 
widespread and may affect many people, the 
plaintiff must show that the damage caused him 
or her some specific injury.17 The recognition in 
Sierra Club v. Morton that environmental degra-
dation could constitute injury18 was crucial for 
the future of environmental standing. “Aesthetic 
and environmental well-being, like economic 
well-being, are important ingredients of the 
quality of life in our society, and the fact that 
particular environmental interests are shared 
by the many rather than the few does not make 
them less deserving of legal protection through 
the judicial process.”19 The Sierra Club sued 
under the Administrative Procedure Act for an 
injunction to prevent the development by Walt 
Disney Enterprises of a ski resort in the Mineral 
King Valley in the Sequoia National Forest. The 
remoteness of the area would require construc-
tion of a road and a power line into the resort. It 
was this remoteness and the resulting wilderness-
like quality of the area that Sierra Club sought to 
protect. The Court recognized that the develop-
ment and the road would injure the aesthetic and 
recreational values of those who used the area, 
but nevertheless found that Sierra Club did not 
have standing because it failed to show that any 
of its members used the area or would be signifi-
cantly impacted by the development.20
The Court noted that its holding requiring 
individual concrete injury does not preclude 
judicial review of injuries to the public interest. It 
insisted, however, that those who have the most 
at stake in protecting those injuries because of 
their own direct injury are the ones who should 
seek review.21 The Court revisited this idea from 
a slightly different perspective in Massachusetts 
v. EPA, noting that the fact that the injury is 
“widely shared” does not minimize the injury to 
the individual.22 In that case, the widely shared 
injury is the effect of climate change. Massachu-
setts was able to establish the injury requisite 
16. Id. at 734-35.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 734.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 735.
21. Id. at 740.
22. Massachusetts,549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007).
for standing because although the environmen-
tal effects of climate change are global, Massa-
chusetts also suffered local injury, i.e., rising sea 
levels are swallowing the state’s coastlines.23 As a 
coastal landowner, the commonwealth suffered a 
particularized injury.24 Massachusetts, then, had 
standing to seek judicial review with potential 
global impact.
A further irony of environmental standing is 
that it is often based on aesthetic injury, which 
will always be subjective, seemingly the antith-
esis of the required concreteness. In Animal Legal 
Defense Fund v. Glickman, the plaintiff sought 
standing on the basis that he had an aesthetic 
interest in observing animals, in this case sev-
eral primates, living under humane conditions.25 
The plaintiff had been an employee and volun-
teer of animal welfare and rescue organizations, 
was trained in wildlife rehabilitation, and had 
experience investigating complaints regarding 
treatment of wildlife.26 Over the period of a year, 
he visited a local animal park several times and 
attested that his visits only stopped because his 
health prevented them.27 During this time, he 
complained about the living conditions of sev-
eral primates.28 Based on these details, the court 
granted standing. “The key requirement, one that 
Mr. Jurnove clearly satisfies, is that the plaintiff 
must have suffered his injury in a personal and 
individual way—for instance, by seeing with his 
own eyes the particular animals whose condition 
caused him aesthetic injury.”29 On one level, the 
plaintiff’s injury is purely aesthetic—his visits 
to the animal park were to view the animals, to 
watch them. Although not expressly, the court’s 
holding encompasses a more expansive definition 
of aesthetics, one that has a moral component. 
Mr. Jurnove’s background reveals that his inter-
est in protecting animals is deeper than viewing 
them living under humane conditions; it is more 
likely that his concerns regarding the living con-
ditions of the primates come more from a moral 
conviction rather than an aesthetic one.
The WildEarth Guardians30 court also stretched 
the concept of aesthetic injury. In that case, the 
district court quite easily seemed to reach the 
conclusion that the plaintiff’s statement that his 
23. Id. at 522-23.
24. Id. at 522.
25. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 154 F.3d 426, 429 (D.C. App. 1998).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 430.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 433.
30. WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D. Colo. 
2011).
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enjoyment of eastern and central Wyoming was 
injured by the impending disappearance of the 
diving beetle because of failure to list them as 
a threatened or endangered species.31 The court 
found that the plaintiff demonstrated a concrete 
and particularized injury despite his never having 
seen a diving beetle in the area, as follows:
That Mr. Tuchton’s alleged injury is concrete 
and particularized is beyond contention. Con-
trary to the Secretary’s argument, Mr. Tutch-
ton need not allege that he has actually seen a 
Diving Beetle or that the Diving Beetle is in 
some way essential to his personal or profes-
sional well-being. He need only establish that 
his enjoyment of the area is in some way depen-
dent upon the continued existence of the Div-
ing Beetle.32
The court cited Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life for the proposition that the desire to view 
wildlife is a cognizable interest for purposes of 
determining standing.33 This is probably a stretch 
of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The court rea-
soned that it was not surprising the plaintiff had 
never actually seen a diving beetle since his con-
tention was that they were threatened or endan-
gered.34 However, that reasoning is circular since 
it is based on the merits of the case when stand-
ing was not yet established. It is unlikely this case 
represents a real development in environmental 
standing jurisprudence, though it is does dem-
onstrate a lack of clarity regarding what consti-
tutes an injury for standing purposes. Indeed, the 
court blamed the Supreme Court for vacillating 
“between expansive and limiting applications 
of standing, often without discernible reason or 
justification” and failing “to provide meaningful 
guidance to lower courts.”35
The WildEarth Guardians court actually had 
more trouble with the requirement that the injury 
be actual or imminent. “Much of the confusion 
over the Supreme Court’s standing jurispru-
dence arises from the determination of whether 
a party’s alleged injury is ‘actual or imminent.’”36 
The court pointed to the decisions in Friends of 
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services 
(TOC), Inc.37 and Summers v. Earth Island Insti-
31. Id. at 1222.
32. Id.
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Id. n.6.
35. Id. at 1224.
36. Id. at 1225.
37. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
tute38 as being inconsistent, but nevertheless then 
crafted a rule to reconcile them.39
The WildEarth Guardians court was correct 
that the requirement of imminence is problem-
atic, though probably more so for plaintiffs than 
courts. In Lujan, plaintiffs failed to meet the 
actual or imminent component of the injury test 
because although they had visited the affected 
area in the past and hoped to do so again in the 
future, they had no specific plans to go back.40 
In that case, the plaintiffs challenged the appli-
cation of the ESA to only federally funded proj-
ects in the United States and on the high seas. 
Specifically, they maintained that rehabilitation 
of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile in Egypt 
would endanger the Nile crocodile, and that an 
Agency for International Development project 
in Sri Lanka would endanger species including 
the Asian elephant and leopard.41 Both plaintiffs 
stated in their affidavits that they had visited 
the affected areas in the past but only that they 
intended to visit the areas again in the future and 
hoped to see the animals.42 However, they had no 
current concrete plans to do so and, in fact, civil 
war in Sri Lanka vented one plaintiff from mak-
ing such plans.43 The Court held:
They plainly contain no facts, however, show-
ing how damage to the species will produce 
“imminent” injury to Mses. Kelly and Skilbred. 
That the women “had visited” the areas of the 
projects before the projects commenced proves 
nothing. As we have said in a related context, 
“‘Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in 
itself show a present case or controversy regard-
ing injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by 
any continuing, present adverse effects.’”44
Imminence is not necessarily a temporal 
requirement. Indeed, in the Lujan Court’s state-
ment of the standing rule, it sets “actual or immi-
nent” against “not conjectural or hypothetical,”45 
which does not suggest temporality. The failure 
of the plaintiffs in Lujan was not that they did 
not have plans to visit the affected areas soon—it 
was that they did not have concrete plans at all, 
just the idea that they would like to return to 
these sites.
38. 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
39. WildEarth Guardians, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
40. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992).
41. Id. at 563.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 563-64.
44. Id. at 564 (internal references omitted).
45. Id. at 560-61.
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The plaintiff’s future plans were even more 
tentative in Summers v. Earth Island Institute.46 
In that case the original dispute was resolved 
when the case was settled.47 The plaintiffs, how-
ever, sought to continue the case to challenge 
the timber-salvage regulations in question with 
regard to future projects and received an injunc-
tion in the district court invalidating five of the 
regulations.48 After the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
injunction, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to determine whether Earth Island Institute 
could still challenge the regulations. The Court 
held that the plaintiff did not have standing in 
part because the affidavits submitted based the 
claim of injury on the fact that the plaintiff vis-
ited many national forests and planned to visit 
many more. The Court stated:
There may be a chance, but is hardly a likeli-
hood, that Bensman’s wanderings will bring 
him to a parcel about to be affected by a project 
unlawfully subject to the regulations. Indeed, 
without further specification it is impossible to 
tell which projects are (in respondents’ view) 
unlawfully subject to the regulations.49
The result was different in Laidlaw, where 
the plaintiffs easily established past use of the 
affected area, but failed to show concrete plans 
of future use. However, the Laidlaw Court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs demonstrated injury-
in-fact.50 In that case, the plaintiffs lived near 
the affected area, had used the area in the past 
for specific activities, and testified that the only 
reason they no longer used the area and had no 
plans to return to the area was fear of the harmful 
effect of the pollution.51 The Court specifically 
distinguished this holding from Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife:
Nor can the affiants’ conditional statements—
that they would use the nearby North Tyger 
River for recreation if Laidlaw were not dis-
charging pollutants into it—be equated with 
the speculative “‘some day’ intentions” to visit 
endangered species halfway around the world 
that we held insufficient to show injury in fact 
in Defenders of Wildlife.52
46. Summers, 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
47. Id. at 491.
48. Id. at 492.
49. Id. at 495.
50. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000).
51. Id. at 181-83.
52. Id. at 184.
From Summers and Laidlaw particularly, the 
court in WildEarth Guardians fashioned the fol-
lowing rule:
Where a party demonstrates repeated past usage 
of the affected area, either by his proximity to 
the affected area or repeated, habitual, even if 
infrequent, visits, the likelihood that he will 
return is readily established by reference to his 
plans to continue past usage. . . . A party need 
not demonstrate “concrete plans” to return. 
In contrast, where a party does not live in the 
immediate vicinity of the affected area and has 
only demonstrated a sporadic history of past 
visits, he must establish his intention to return 
with more specificity. In essence, if not in name, 
these standards allow courts a means of objecti-
fying what is otherwise an inherently subjective 
determination—the credibility of the affiant.53
This may, however, be a misreading of Laid-
law. The key factor in Laidlaw was likely not the 
plaintiffs’ proximity to the affected areas, but 
their explanations of why they no longer visited 
the area. It was not their proximity that suggested 
they would one day return to the area so much as 
their statements of how they would like to con-
tinue to use the area if not for the pollution. Nev-
ertheless, the rule does correctly suggest that the 
court should consider (and the plaintiff should 
therefore plead), the totality of the circumstances.
Causation
The second prong of the standing test requires 
that the plaintiff’s injury be “fairly traceable” to 
the defendant with no intervening third-party 
cause.54 This element is far less problematic than 
determination of injury but still raises some chal-
lenges for plaintiffs in environmental cases. In 
both Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glick-
man55 and Massachusetts v. EPA,56 causation was 
at issue and in both cases the courts found the 
plaintiffs adequately showed causation, though 
the dissents strongly objected.
In Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glick-
man, one issue was whether the plaintiff’s injury 
could be reasonably traced to the Secretary of 
Agriculture’s Animal Welfare Act rules when 
it was a third party, the animal park, who was 
actually responsible for the living conditions of 
53. WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1226 (D. 
Colo. 2011).
54. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
55. 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. App. 1998).
56. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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the primates that caused the plaintiff’s aesthetic 
injury. The plaintiff claimed that it was the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture’s failure to adopt 
regulations that met the minimum standards of 
the Animal Welfare Act that allowed the animal 
park to continue to house animals under such 
conditions.57 The court held that the plaintiff 
met the causation element, noting that “Supreme 
Court precedent establishes that the causation 
requirement for constitutional standing is met 
when a plaintiff demonstrates that the challenged 
agency action authorizes the conduct that alleg-
edly caused the plaintiff’s injuries, if that conduct 
would allegedly be illegal otherwise.”58 In this 
case, the agency’s actions in failing to promulgate 
adequate regulations allowed the animal park to 
keep animals under conditions that were illegal 
under the Animal Welfare Act, thus causing the 
plaintiff’s aesthetic injury.59 The dissent found it 
“frightening at a constitutional level the major-
ity’s assumption that the government causes 
everything that it does not prevent.”60
In Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA did not dispute 
that there is a causal connection between green-
house gas emissions and global warming.61 The 
Agency claimed, however, that for the purposes 
of standing analysis, its decision not to regulate 
greenhouse gases from new automobiles was an 
insignificant cause of the plaintiff Massachu-
setts’ injuries, especially given the predicted 
rise in emissions from countries like China and 
India.62 The Court disagreed, saying that it was 
“erroneous” to assume “that a small incremen-
tal step, because it is incremental, can never be 
attacked in a federal judicial forum.”63 The rela-
tively small contribution to the causation (from 
new U.S. automobile emissions) in contrast to the 
expansive scope of the problem (global warming) 
sets an important benchmark in environmental 
standing jurisprudence. This determination was 
too tenuous for the dissent, however, which rea-
soned that Massachusetts could not show that 
its injury—risk of loss of its coastline due to the 
effects of global warming—was actually caused 
by the very small impact from EPA’s failure to 
regulate domestic automobile emissions, given 
57. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 154 F.3d at 430.
58. Id. at 440.
59. See id. at 438.
60. Id. at 452 (Sentelle, Silberman, Ginsburg, LeCraft Henderson, 
JJ., dissenting).
61. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 524.
that such regulations would only address a “frac-
tion of 4% of global emissions.”64
Redressability
The final standing element, redressability, 
requires that “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed 
to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be 
‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”65 In Lujan, 
the Court held that in addition to failing to meet 
the injury element, the respondents also failed to 
establish redressability because it was not likely 
the Court’s decision against the agency would 
require the third-party funding agencies to par-
ticipate in the consultation sought by the respon-
dents.66 Respondents’ case against the Secretary 
of the Interior sought to compel the secretary to 
interpret existing ESA regulations requiring con-
sultation regarding threatened and endangered 
species as applying to overseas as well as domestic 
projects.67 The hurdle that the respondents could 
not overcome, according to the Court, was the 
fact that the funding agencies were not parties 
to the case themselves and were likely not bound 
by the regulation.68 The respondents’ requested 
remedy might redress the injury if the third-party 
agencies chose to comply with the regulation, but 
it was speculative that they would do so.
The respondents in Lujan also faced a second-
ary problem. The Court noted that the funding 
agencies provided only a small fraction of the 
funding for the projects at issue.69 Respondents 
failed to show that if the requested consultation 
happened and the funding agencies did not fund 
the projects as a result, the projects would be sus-
pended and cause no more harm.70
Contrast this scenario with the language from 
Massachusetts v. EPA quoted above, which held 
that small, incremental steps were sufficient to 
establish redressability. In that case, the fact that 
the U.S. auto emissions were only a small contrib-
utor to global climate change was still sufficient,71 
whereas in Lujan the fact that U.S. agency fund-
ing was only a small part of the total funding of 
the international projects was not.72 From a legal 
standpoint, the distinguishing factor is the causa-
64. Id. at 544-45 (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting).
65. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (internal 
citations omitted).
66. Id. at 568-69.
67. Id. at 559.
68. Id. at 568-69.
69. Id. at 571.
70. Id.
71. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497, 523-24 (2007).
72. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571.
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tion versus redressability analysis. However, the 
real key to the different treatment may be in the 
pleadings. The respondents in Lujan failed to rec-
ognize that they needed to plead facts sufficient 
to overcome the fractional impact of the defen-
dant’s actions while the petitioners in Massachu-
setts succeeded in doing so.
Prudential Standing and Citizen Suits
Article III standing ensures that plaintiffs meet 
the constitutional minimum elements to estab-
lish standing. Courts have added an additional 
layer to the analysis that applies when there is no 
statute granting the plaintiffs the right to seek 
review of government action, though the Court 
in Cetacean Community v. Bush also suggests that 
the prudential standing test is applied when it is 
unclear whether plaintiffs meet the test for injury 
under Article III.73 According to Sierra Club, 
absent such a statute, the plaintiff may still be 
required to show that his interests fall within the 
“zone of interest” protected by the statute.74 It is 
an undemanding test—the plaintiff must show 
only that his interests fall arguably within the 
zone of interest protected by the statute.75 For 
example, in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glick-
man, the court held that the individual plaintiff’s 
interest in viewing animals living in humane 
conditions met the zone of interest test for pru-
dential standing.76 “The very purpose of animal 
exhibitions is, necessarily, to entertain and edu-
cate people; exhibitions make no sense unless one 
takes the interests of their human visitors into 
account.”77 One reading of the holding is that the 
court was suggesting that the purpose of the Ani-
mal Welfare Act is to protect people. However, an 
alternate reading confirms the expansive reach of 
the zone of interest test; even if the main purpose 
of the Animal Welfare Act is to protect, among 
other animals, those living in zoos and exhibi-
tions, people who want to view those animals 
also fall within that zone of interest.
73. Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004).
74. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-34 (1972); see also 
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 154 F.3d 426, 431 (D.C. App. 1998). In 
Sierra Club, the plaintiff was suing under §10 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, which grants the right to seek judicial review 
to anyone who suffers an injury under a statute due to federal 
agency action. 5 U.S.C. §702 (quoted in Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 
at 732.) So, for example, in Animal Legal Def. Fund, the plaintiff 
sued under §10 because the Animal Welfare Act has no citizen 
suit provision. In discussing the “zone of interest” test, the court 
refers to it as a “gloss” on §10. 154 F.3d at 444.
75. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 154 F.3d at 444.
76. Id. at 444-45.
77. Id.
While Article III constitutional standing is a 
mandatory requirement, prudential standing is 
a judicially created requirement that is discre-
tionary.78 There is, however, a major exception to 
the prudential standing requirement that is espe-
cially important in environmental cases: where 
Congress has provided a statutory “citizen suit” 
provision, a plaintiff is relieved of the prudential 
standing requirement.79 Major federal environ-
mental statutes have citizen suit provisions allow-
ing citizens to petition the courts for review of 
actions under those statutes. For example, the 
Clean Water Act authorizes any citizen to “com-
mence a civil action on his own behalf ” against 
any person or government agency for violation 
of Clean Water Act standards or against EPA 
for failure to perform its administrative duties.80 
Citizen suit provisions do not automatically con-
fer standing, however, and a plaintiff still has to 
demonstrate a personal injury that is more than 
a generalized grievance and that the government 
failed to do something required by the statute.81 
Because citizen suits are less common with ani-
mal protection statutes—only the ESA has a citi-
zen suit provision82—plaintiffs in animal welfare 
standing cases typically will have to meet the 
“zone of interest” test in addition to the Article 
III elements.
Informational and Procedural Standing
In addition to substantive injuries, plaintiffs may 
try to establish standing based on informational 
or procedural injuries. To some degree, these con-
cepts broaden the injury requirement for Article 
III standing,83 allowing in plaintiffs who would 
otherwise be barred, but these are not easy inju-
ries to establish. Informational injuries are rooted 
in statutes requiring agencies to provide informa-
tion; their failure to do so may cause injury to 
an organization whose purpose is to disseminate 
that information.84 For purposes of informa-
tional standing, a plaintiff “is injured-in-fact . . . 
78. Sonia S. Waisman et al., Animal Law: Cases & Materials 285 
(5th ed. 2014).
79. American Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld 
Ent., Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 19 (D.D.C. 2011).
80. 33 U.S.C. §1365(a).
81. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992).
82. 16 U.S.C. §1540(g).
83. Randall S. Abate & Michael J. Myers, Broadening the Scope of 
Environmental Standing: Procedural and Informational Injury-in-
Fact After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 12 UCLA J. Envtl. L. 
& Pol’y 345 (1994).
84. Id. at 349.
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because he did not get what the statute entitled 
him to receive.”85
In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Yuetter, 
where the Animal Welfare Act required report-
ing regarding compliance with AWA regulations 
concerning treatment of laboratory animals, the 
plaintiff claimed an informational injury because 
the regulations failed to include rats, mice, and 
birds in the definition of “animal,” making it 
impossible for the plaintiff to obtain and dissemi-
nate information regarding those species.86 The 
court elaborated on the requirements of informa-
tional standing: (1) that there is a link between 
the agency’s actions and the organization’s activi-
ties; (2) that the information is essential to the 
organization’s activities (though not necessarily 
all of the organization’s activities); and (3) that the 
organization’s interests must be within the zone 
of interests protected by the statute.87 The parties 
contested the second requirement: the plaintiffs 
claimed that the lack of data regarding mice, rats, 
and birds rendered their reporting to their mem-
bers infeasible while defendants claimed that the 
organization’s mission was advocating for better 
conditions for all animals and that was not suf-
ficiently hindered by the regulations.88
Plaintiffs initially won the argument with the 
court saying that it is sufficient that “an activity 
that is germane to the organization’s purpose be 
significantly hindered.”89 However, the organi-
zation lost on appeal where the court held that 
although the informational injury was sufficient 
to establish Article III standing, the organization 
nevertheless failed to meet the zone of interest 
test. The court held:
The principle established by our decisions, then, 
is that to come within the zone of interests of 
the statute under which suit is brought, an orga-
nization must show more than a general corpo-
rate purpose to promote the interests to which 
the statute is addressed. Rather it must show a 
congressional intent to benefit the organization 
or some indication that the organization is “a 
peculiarly suitable challenger of administrative 
neglect.”90
85. American Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld 
Ent., Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 23 (D.D.C. 2011).
86. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Yuetter, 760 F. Supp. 923 (D.D.C. 
1991) (vacated by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 
(D.C. Cir. 1994)) (cited in Abate & Myers, supra note 83, at 352).
87. Id. at 926-27.
88. Id. at 927.
89. Id.
90. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 23 F.3d at 503.
Absent specific citizen suit provisions, this is a 
tough showing.
In American Society for the Prevention of Cru-
elty to Animals v. Feld Entertainment, the court 
considered informational standing for an organi-
zational plaintiff, but here too the plaintiff could 
not meet the burden.91 This case was brought 
under the ESA, which contains a citizen suit 
provision.92 However, the plaintiffs brought the 
case under §9 of the Endangered Species Act, the 
takings provision.93 The court held that there is 
no reporting requirement in §9 and therefore the 
organizational plaintiff could not claim a right 
to information based on that provision under 
which it brought suit.94 The organization’s infor-
mational standing would only be triggered if the 
defendant’s activities constituted a “take,” the 
defendant failed to apply for a permit as required 
in §10, and either the defendant failed to disclose 
the information on the permit application or the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) refused to 
make the information public.95
Procedural standing is grounded in an agen-
cy’s failure to comply with statutory procedural 
mandates.96 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the 
federal appeals court originally upheld proce-
dural standing based on the citizen suit provision 
in the ESA, which provides that “any person may 
commence a civil suit on his own behalf (A) to 
enjoin any person, including the United States 
and any other governmental instrumentality or 
agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of 
any provision of this chapter.”97 The Supreme 
Court found far too broad the interpretation that 
the statute confers standing on all persons who 
just want to ensure the law is upheld. This is the 
type of generalized grievance that the Court has 
consistently rejected.98 The Court did suggest the 
types of procedural injury that would support 
standing: (1) cases where the disregard of the pro-
cedural requirement would injure a substantive 
interest; (2) cases in which many persons have 
suffered the same concrete injury; and (3) cases 
in which a statute grants the plaintiff a “reward” 
for bringing a case against another private party 
that would benefit the government.99 The “take-
91. American Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 659 F.3d 
at 23-24.
92. Id. at 17, 19.
93. Id. at 22.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 23-24.
96. Abate & Myers, supra note 83, at 353.
97. 16 U.S.C. §1540(g) (quoted in Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571-72).
98. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992).
99. Id. at 572-73.
52 | T H E  E N V I R O N M E N TA L  F O R U M Copyright © 2016, Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, D.C. www.eli.org. 
Reprinted by permission from The Environmental Forum®, July/August  2016
away” from the Court’s reasoning is clearly “that 
in suits against the Government, at least, the con-
crete injury requirement must remain.”100
To ensure plaintiffs have more than a general-
ized interest, some courts have applied a “nexus 
test” for procedural standing, requiring a suf-
ficient geographical nexus to establish a con-
crete injury.101 The nexus test originated in City 
of Davis v. Coleman 1¸02 a NEPA case, where the 
court stated:
The procedural injury implicit in agency failure 
to prepare an EIS—the creation of a risk that 
serious environmental impacts will be over-
looked—is itself a sufficient “injury in fact” to 
support standing, provided this injury is alleged 
by a plaintiff having a sufficient geographical 
nexus to the site of the challenged project that 
he may be expected to suffer whatever environ-
mental consequences the project may have. This 
is a broad test, but because the nature and scope 
of environmental consequences are often highly 
uncertain before study we think it an appropri-
ate test.103
The court held that the city established, 
because of its proximity to the contested project, 
a highway interchange, that the city could “be 
expected to suffer a wide variety of environmen-
tal consequences,” including damage to the water 
supply.104
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit found stand-
ing for the plaintiffs in Oregon Environmental 
Council v. Kunzman,105 who were challenging an 
inadequate environmental impact statement that 
allowed for spraying of pesticides to eradicate the 
gypsy moth.106 The court reasoned:
The Secretary argues that to allow anyone to 
bring an action to enforce compliance with 
NEPA would allow even individuals in states 
without gypsy moths to bring this action. This 
case does not present such a situation. . . . In 
this case, OEC’s members reside in a state with 
an actual gypsy moth problem and thus may 
challenge a nationwide EIS that is applicable to 
them.107
100. Id. at 578.
101. Randall S. Abate, Massachusetts v. EPA and the Future of Envi-
ronmental Standing in Climate Change Litigation and Beyond, 33 
Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 121, 126 (2008).
102. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
103. Id. at 671 (cited in Abate & Myers, supra note 83, at 354).
104. Id.
105. 817 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1987).
106. Id. at 489 (cited in Abate & Myers, supra note 83, at 355).
107. Id. at 491.
The nexus test may be broad, but Lujan dem-
onstrates that it can still be an obstacle. The 
plaintiffs’ purpose in Lujan was to challenge an 
interpretation that allowed FWS to apply con-
sultation regulations in the ESA only to domes-
tic projects. Given the purpose of the case, it is 
unlikely that any plaintiff could have established 
a geographical nexus. The plaintiffs offered three 
alternative nexus tests: “ecosystem nexus,” “ani-
mal nexus,” and “vocational nexus.”108 The eco-
system nexus test sought to extend geographical 
nexus to anybody who uses any part of the con-
tiguous ecosystem, but the Court noted that 
precedent holding that use couldn’t even be “in 
the vicinity” precluded that interpretation.109 The 
Court rejected all three proposed tests.110 Despite 
the challenges presented by Lujan, though, Abate 
and Myers show that procedural and informa-
tional injuries are a cognizable basis for standing 
in environmental and animal cases,111 particu-
larly where informational and procedural injuries 
are brought together.112
Organizational Standing
Most of the above discussion suggests that the 
plaintiffs were individuals, when in reality, vir-
tually all of the plaintiffs in these cases were 
organizations, which raises additional standing 
requirements. An organization may have standing 
based on injury to its members;113 however, with 
one exception, organizations only have standing 
if they can show (1) individual members have 
standing; (2) the issue of the lawsuit is within the 
mission of the organization; and (3) neither the 
lawsuit nor the remedy require the participation 
of individual members.114 This means the orga-
nization has to meet all of the requirements dis-
cussed above, with two additional elements. In 
WildEarth Guardians, the court noted the special 
problem that these additional elements can cause 
in environmental lawsuits, which are often based 
on federal regulations, stating:
In some contexts, most notably environmental 
law, the party with the most significant stake 
in the controversy, the organization that has 
actually participated in the rulemaking pro-
108. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565-67.
109. Id. at 566.
110. Id.
111. Abate & Myers, supra note 83, at 368-80.
112. Id. at 388.
113. Abate, supra note 101, at 127.
114. WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1223 (D. 
Colo. 2011).
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cess, lacks independent standing to seek judi-
cial relief. Instead of ensuring that parties have 
“a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable 
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that 
controversy,” the modern conception of stand-
ing forces many environmental plaintiffs to rely 
upon the “discrete injury” suffered by one of its 
members, a party with at best a derivative stake 
in the controversy, to establish their standing.115
The requirement that members have standing 
negates the possibility of an organization pursu-
ing a lawsuit based solely on the interests stated 
in its mission. The Court in Sierra Club v. Morton 
made it clear that a “mere ‘interest in a problem,’ 
no matter how longstanding the interest and no 
matter how qualified the organization is in eval-
uating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to 
render the organization ‘adversely affected’ or 
‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of the APA.”116 
In other words, a generalized interest in the envi-
ronment is not enough, but the recreational or 
aesthetic injuries of members will suffice.117 How-
ever, once an organization establishes standing, 
it can argue public interest as well.118 Sierra Club 
failed to show that its members suffered the req-
uisite injury, even aesthetic injury, because it did 
not state facts showing that they used the area 
at issue.119 Similarly, Earth Island Institute failed 
to establish standing in its case challenging tim-
ber sale regulations in part because the member’s 
alleged injury, on which the organization relied 
to assert its standing, did not specify a particular-
ized injury.120
An organization can establish standing without 
having to rely on injury to its members by show-
ing that “the defendant’s actions cause a ‘concrete 
and demonstrable injury to the organization’s 
activities’ that is ‘more than simply a setback to 
the organization’s abstract social interests.’”121 
Known as Havens standing, the organization 
must show under this test that it suffered an 
injury to its interest in promoting its mission 
and that it expended resources to counteract that 
injury.122 This standard seems a bit counterintui-
tive given the Court’s statement in Sierra Club v. 
115. Id. at 1224.
116. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).
117. Id. at 734-37.
118. Id. at 737.
119. Id. at 735.
120. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 495-96 (2009).
121. American Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld 
Ent., Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 25 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Havens Realty 
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982)).
122. Id. (citing Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., Inc., 633 F.3d 1136, 
1138 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
Morton that an organization’s “mere interest” in 
an issue by itself is an insufficient basis on which 
to claim an injury.123 In American Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entertain-
ment, the court clarified that to establish Havens 
standing, the injury has to be “more than sim-
ply a setback to the organization’s abstract social 
interests”;124 it must impact the organization’s 
mission.125 In other words, it must be not just the 
organization’s interests that are at stake, but what 
it does in support of those interests.
In American Society for the Prevention of Cru-
elty to Animals v. Feld Entertainment, the organi-
zation seeking standing claimed that the circus’s 
use of bullhooks to control its elephants under-
mined the organization’s advocacy and education 
efforts aimed at eliminating the use of bull-
hooks.126 Unfortunately, the court determined it 
did not need to answer the question of whether 
injury to an organization’s advocacy efforts was 
sufficient injury for Havens standing because the 
rest of the standing inquiry would fail at the cau-
sation element.127
States as Plaintiffs
After Massachusetts v. EPA, states present a spe-
cial case in standing determinations. In that 
case, the Court recognized that Massachusetts 
had a special position for purposes of determin-
ing standing.128 As a quasi-sovereign, Massachu-
setts has sovereign interests, but not the ability 
to defend those interests. “Massachusetts cannot 
invade Rhode Island to force reductions in green-
house gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emis-
sions treaty with China or India, and in some 
circumstances the exercise of its police powers 
to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions might 
well be pre-empted.”129 Basing its decision on 
the 1907 case, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,130 
the Court held that Massachusetts, as a property 
holder, was entitled to special solicitude in the 
standing analysis and established the requisite 
injury for standing.131 The Court noted that this 
special solicitude does not relieve the state of the 
123. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).
124. American Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 659 F.3d 
at 25 (quoting Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 379).
125. Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 
101 F.3d 1423, 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
126. Id. at 26.
127. Id.
128. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497, 518-21 (2007).
129. Id. at 519.
130. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
131. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520.
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need to establish that it meets the injury, causa-
tion, and redressability elements of standing.132
Lessons for Animal Law
As with injuries to environmental resources, inju-
ries to animals are redressable only if humans are 
injured as well.133 Statutes purport to provide 
for welfare and protection of animals, but only 
humans can seek enforcement of those statutes. 
Moreover, only humans who themselves have a 
stake in the outcome of the case can even pur-
sue a case. With that in mind, the line of envi-
ronmental standing cases, and the smattering of 
animal standing cases among them, offer insight 
into how plaintiffs can strengthen their standing 
cases.
Pleadings Matter: It’s in the Details
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 
standing.134 Furthermore, the plaintiff retains the 
burden of sustaining standing throughout the 
various stages of the case. For example:
Since they are not mere pleading requirements 
but rather an indispensable part of the plain-
tiff’s case, each element must be supported in 
the same way as any other matter on which the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the 
manner and degree of evidence required at the 
successive stages of the litigation.135
Although general allegations are sufficient ini-
tially, on summary judgment, specific facts must 
be stated in the affidavits. If the case goes to trial, 
standing must be established through evidence.136
In both Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and Sum-
mers v. Earth Island Institute, the Court noted 
the plaintiffs’ failure to plead sufficient details to 
establish standing from the beginning. In Lujan, 
the plaintiffs’ affidavits “plainly contain[ed] no 
facts . . . showing how damage to the species 
will produce ‘imminent’ injury to Mses. Kelly 
and Skilbred.”137 The situation was slightly dif-
ferent in Summers. In that case, although an ini-
tial affidavit did contain facts showing that the 
individual plaintiff had specific plans to visit 
the site of the timber sale, that issue was settled. 
132. Id. at 521-26.
133. See Joanna B. Wymyslo, Standing for Endangered Species: Justiciability 
Beyond Humanity, 15 U. Balt. J. Envtl. L. 45 (2007).
134. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 564.
Another individual plaintiff filed an affidavit 
that he had suffered injury in the past, but “[t]
hat does not suffice for several reasons: because 
it was not tied to application of the challenged 
regulations, because it does not identify any par-
ticular site, and because it relates to past injury 
rather than imminent future injury that is sought 
to be enjoined.”138 The plaintiff did allege that he 
planned future trips to national forests, but the 
Court determined that “[i]t is a failure to allege 
that any particular timber sale or other project 
claimed to be unlawfully subject to the regula-
tions will impede a specific and concrete plan 
of Bensman’s to enjoy the National Forests.”139 
There was an additional problem in that case for 
the organizational plaintiff. The Sierra Club did 
not file individual affidavits of its members and 
therefore did not show with evidence sufficient 
for the purposes of standing that it had members 
who used and enjoyed the Sequoia National For-
est.140 The Court wanted not just an affidavit from 
the organization describing its members’ activi-
ties, but also affidavits from individual members.
Contrast the details provided in the affidavits 
filed in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman. 
The plaintiff established that he was trained in 
wildlife rehabilitation and had spent many years 
in animal rescue.141 Furthermore, he established 
that between specific dates he visited the animal 
park a specific number of times and gave a reason 
for not continuing those visits.142 He even estab-
lished how long each visit lasted and what he 
witnessed during those visits.143 Finally, he stated 
that he planned to reinstate his visits within a few 
weeks and to continue them into the future.144 
The plaintiff gave sufficient detail that the court 
was able to find standing.145
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Animals v. Feld Entertainment highlights how 
important the details are at all stages of the liti-
gation. At the earliest stages of the litigation, the 
individual plaintiff pled facts that established 
“emotional attachment, coupled with his desire 
to visit the elephants and his ability to recognize 
the effects of mistreatment” that was sufficient to 
establish the necessary injury-in-fact.146 However, 
after a trial that lasted six weeks, the trial court 
138. Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 495 (2009).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 499.
141. 154 F.3d 426, 429 (D.C. App. 1998).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 435.
146. 659 F.3d 13, 18 (D.D.C. 2011).
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found that the plaintiff was not credible and that 
the evidence presented failed to establish that he 
was injured.147 Among the facts the court noted 
against him: he was a paid plaintiff, he dispar-
aged the elephants and failed to take advantage 
of opportunities to visit them, he could not iden-
tify the elephants to which he claimed an attach-
ment, and he used bullhooks in working with the 
elephants, casting doubt on his claim that he did 
not want to witness any more mistreatment.148 
Reviewing this evidence, the district court, in 
very detailed and sometimes strongly worded 
Findings of Fact, found that the plaintiff failed 
to establish the emotional attachment on which 
he based his claim of injury.149 The appeals court 
upheld the determination, concluding:
Although at the pleading stage general factual 
allegations may suffice to establish standing, “[i]
n response to a summary judgment motion . . 
. the plaintiff can no longer rest on such mere 
allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or 
other evidence specific facts.” Where, as here, 
standing remains an issue at trial, the plain-
tiff’s burden is higher still: the facts establishing 
standing must be “supported adequately by the 
evidence adduced at trial.”150
Much was at stake in this case. Since plaintiffs 
also failed to establish organizational standing, 
everything was riding on the individual plain-
tiff. Had plaintiffs won, Ringling Bros. and Bar-
num & Bailey Circus would have been forced 
to change its treatment of elephants. As it was, 
after plaintiffs failed to establish standing, Feld 
Entertainment won a settlement of $16 million 
to cover its litigation costs.151
Extending the Holdings
The environmental standing cases are compli-
cated and nuanced. Because standing is a con-
stitutional threshold, courts provide detailed and 
carefully considered opinions. Equally careful 
reading of these opinions, especially in conjunc-
tion with each other, reveals where courts may be 
147. Id.
148. Id. at 20.
149. American Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld 
Ent., Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55, 67 (D.D.C. 2009).
150. American Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 659 F.3d 
at 19 (internal citations omitted).
151. Thomas Heath, Ringling Circus Prevails in 14-Year Legal Case; Collects 
$16M From Humane Society, Others, Wash. Post, May 16, 2014, 
at A14, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/cap-
italbusiness/ringling-circus-prevails-in-14-year-legal-case-collects-
16m-from-humane-society-others/2014/05/16/50ce00b8-dd15-
11e3-8009-71de85b9c527_story.html.
willing to go a little farther. Even dissents provide 
clues into where courts may be willing to go given 
the right set of facts. The discussion that follows 
addresses some examples that broaden some of 
the language in existing cases in ways that could 
enhance standing in animal cases.
Aesthetic Injury
The Court’s recognition of aesthetic injury in 
Lujan was crucial for environmental standing, 
and for many animal law cases it works as well—
being able to view animals in their natural envi-
ronment is an aesthetic interest.152 Courts seem 
poised to extend the aesthetic injury doctrine. 
Arguably, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. already goes 
beyond a strict interpretation of aesthetic injury. 
In that case, the Court found that the plaintiffs 
established injury-in-fact based on their percep-
tion that the river was polluted.153 Also, in Ani-
mal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, the court’s 
determination that aesthetic injury includes view-
ing captive animals living in humane conditions 
seems to stretch the concept of aesthetic injury. 
Humaneness is more of a moral idea than an aes-
thetic one. Indeed, the dissent had trouble with 
extending aesthetic injury. “Humaneness, like 
beauty, is in the eye of the beholder: one’s indi-
vidual judgment about what is or is not humane 
depends entirely on one’s personal notions of 
compassion and sympathy. I find it difficult to 
imagine a more subjective concept than this.”154 
Further, in American Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entertainment, the dis-
trict court was willing to recognize the individual 
plaintiff’s emotional attachment to the elephants 
as an aesthetic injury.155
Courts appear to be prepared to recog-
nize moral injuries.156 Cass Sunstein makes the 
point that statutes like the Animal Welfare Act, 
enacted along with at least 50 other statutes that 
demonstrate commitment to some form of ani-
mal rights, added a cause of action for the pro-
tection of animals where none existed before.157 
Enacting these statutes in the first place reflects 
152. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. 
App. 1998).
153. 528 U.S. 167, 183-85 (2000) (cited in Sunstein, supra note 6, at 
1351).
154. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 154 F.3d at 448 (Sentelle, Silberman, 
Ginsburg, LeCraft Henderson, JJ., dissenting).
155. American Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld 
Ent., Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 18 (D.D.C. 2011).
156. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1353.
157. Id. at 1354.
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a moral development regarding treatment of ani-
mals in society. Therefore, it would not be too 
much of a stretch for courts to apply the same 
moral consideration. Standing jurisprudence 
continues to evolve. Environmental protection is 
a relatively recent societal development. Environ-
mental standing based on aesthetic, recreational, 
and conservational injuries is even more recent, 
though at this point it is solid (if a little convo-
luted) jurisprudence. It is only a matter of time 
before society’s evolving values regarding animal 
welfare translate into courts applying moral con-
siderations to the standing analysis.
Public Trust
The special solicitude doctrine from Massachu-
setts v. EPA raises the potential that states could 
more easily gain standing to protect at least some 
animals if they were also willing to recognize a 
duty under the public trust doctrine to protect 
wildlife for the benefit of the citizens of the state. 
Going back to the 1892 case Illinois Central R.R. 
v. Illinois, the public trust doctrine holds that the 
state’s sovereign ownership of natural resources 
must be exercised for the public good.158 The 
Court based this public trust on states obtain-
ing sovereign ownership of navigable waters 
upon statehood.159 Over time, the public trust 
expanded to include waters that are not naviga-
ble160 and uses beyond the the traditional “triad” 
of public trust uses, which included fishing, navi-
gation, and commerce.
As society has changed, more recent cases have 
expanded the traditional common law public trust 
doctrine even farther in two directions. First, 
courts have expanded the trust res. While early 
public trust cases focused on submersible lands, 
more recent cases have added, “water, wetlands, 
dry sand beaches, nonnavigable waterways.”161 
Second, courts have also expanded the tradi-
tional uses to include environmental, aesthetic, 
and recreational interests.162 Both scholars and 
courts reiterate the idea that “[s]uch expansion is 
158. 146 U.S. 387, 455-56 (1892) (cited in Michael C. Blumm & 
Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 Utah L. Rev. 
1437, 1440 (2013).
159. Id. at 456 (quoting Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410 
(1842)).
160. Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 158, at 1442.
161. Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in Adjudicat-
ing Climate Change: State, National, and International 
Approaches 99, 104 (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky 
eds., 2009).
162. Id.
well within the function of common law to adapt 
to emerging societal needs.”163
With this in mind, scholars have argued for 
a public trust in wildlife.164 Forty-eight states 
already claim state ownership of wildlife,165 
which is analogous to state ownership of navi-
gable waters. Nevertheless, only a few states have 
gone one step further to also expressly include 
wildlife in the public trust, though most states 
have at least employed some form of trust in 
judicial opinions on the issue,166 making it seem 
that states have all but adopted a public trust 
doctrine for wildlife. A California appeals court, 
for example, found a public trust in wildlife in 
that state in a case regarding protection of rap-
tors and other bird species from wind turbines.167 
However, in doing so, the court distinguished 
between traditional common law public trust and 
a statutory public trust, which is what it applied 
to wildlife.168 This leaves open the question of 
whether there is a common law public trust in 
wildlife in California. But returning to the hold-
ings that the public trust doctrine is expandable 
as public interests change, it seems likely that 
eventually wildlife will be covered by a more 
explicit public trust. At that point, states could 
employ the Court’s “special solicitude” reasoning 
from Massachusetts v. EPA, which was based on 
the idea that “‘the State has an interest indepen-
dent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in 
all the earth and air within its domain. It has 
the last word as to whether its mountains shall be 
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall 
breathe pure air.’”169
Risk
The Court in Massachusetts v. EPA provided an 
additional opportunity for those seeking standing 
163. Id. (citing In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1086-87 (Or. 1924)); see 
also National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 
658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (quoting Marks v. Whitney, 491 
P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971)).
164. Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 158, at 1470. See also Deborah 
G. Musiker et al., The Public Trust and Parens Patriae Doctrines: 
Protecting Wildlife in Uncertain Times, 16 Pub. Land L. Rev. 87 
(1995); Elise C. Pautler, Student Work, Defending Florida’s Marine 
Treasures: An Argument to Expand the Public Trust Doctrine and 
Reinforce Florida’s Role in Coral Reef Protection, 43 Stetson L. Rev. 
151 (2013).
165. Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 158, at 1440.
166. Id. at 1471-79.
167. Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 166 Cal. 
App. 4th 1349 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
168. Id. at 1354 (citing Environmental Prot. & Info. Ctr. v. California 
Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888 (Cal. 2008)).
169. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518-19 (2007) (quoting 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
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in animal welfare cases: in its discussion of spe-
cial solicitude the Court recognized that risk of 
injury meets the Article III injury-in-fact require-
ment.170 This was not the first time that courts 
recognized risk of harm as injury and in fact it is 
discussed less in this case than in previous cas-
es.171 In Northwest Environmental Defense Center 
v. Owens Corning Corp., the court concluded that 
“a plaintiff need not wait until after he has been 
harmed before seeking relief, particularly when 
the injuries are of a kind not readily redressed 
by damages.”172 Previous to that, in Delta Water 
Agency v. United States, the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized not only that a “credible threat of harm is 
sufficient to constitute actual injury for stand-
ing purposes,” but even applied that principle 
to animals in noting, “The extinction of a species, 
the destruction of a wilderness habitat, or the 
fouling of air and water are harms that are fre-
quently difficult or impossible to remedy.”173 In 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court stated without 
any discussion that risk of injury was sufficient as 
though the idea was well-established.174 This basis 
for establishing injury is crucial when the con-
tinued existence of a species is at stake: extinct is 
forever and courts cannot change that outcome 
regardless of the remedy.
The geographical nexus test for procedural 
standing still requires a localized harm.175 In Mas-
sachusetts v. EPA, Massachusetts was able to show 
that global climate change caused a risk of loss of 
the Massachusetts coastline. A state would have 
to be able to show that an agency’s actions would 
cause harm to a species existing locally, even if 
the harm itself was not localized. For example, a 
state with a population of a threatened bird spe-
cies might be harmed by EPA permitting use of 
a specific pesticide that will kill the bugs that the 
birds eat, or by global climate change that kills 
off those same bugs.
Citizen Suits
Congress could grant standing to animals.176 For 
example:
170. Id. at 521.
171. See Abate, supra note 101, at 130-37.
172. 434 F. Supp. 2d 957 (D. Or. 2006) (cited in Abate, supra note 
101, at 135).
173. 306 F.3d 398, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) (cited in 
Abate, supra note 101, at 132).
174. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521.
175. See Abate, supra note 101, at 155.
176. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004).
We see no reason why Article III prevents Con-
gress from authorizing a suit in the name of an 
animal, any more than it prevents suits brought 
in the name of artificial persons such as corpo-
rations, partnerships or trusts, and even ships, 
or of juridically incompetent persons such as 
infants, juveniles, and mental incompetents.177
Cass Sunstein notes that both people and 
animals could have standing to the extent Con-
gress grants it, but Congress has chosen not to 
grant standing to animals.178 In fact, in most ani-
mal protection statutes, Congress failed to even 
include any citizen suit provisions at all.
The one animal protection statute with a citi-
zen suit provision, the ESA, contains a broad 
grant that allows “any person” to bring a suit 
under the statute,179 as follows:
The term “person” means an individual, corpo-
ration, partnership, trust, association, or any 
other private entity; or any officer, employee, 
agent, department, or instrumentality of the 
Federal Government, of any State, municipal-
ity, or political subdivision of a State, or of any 
foreign government; any State, municipality, 
or political subdivision of a State; or any other 
entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States.180
However, the court in Cetacean Community held 
that this definition does not authorize animals to 
bring suit.181
One scholar suggests there are two problems 
with Cetacean Community. First, the court should 
not have determined so readily that its own seem-
ing grant of standing to the Hawai’ian palila was 
dicta, and second, that the court misinterpreted 
the ESA citizen suit provision when it held that 
it precludes animals from having standing.182 
Wymyslo’s discussion highlights the confusion 
created by the inconsistent jurisprudence of ESA 
standing.
It will likely take a series of cases to untangle 
the confused judicial precedent. But Congress 
could quite easily solve the issue by amending the 
ESA to include animals in the citizen suit pro-
vision.183 Moreover, Congress should amend the 
ESA to effectuate its original intent, which con-
templated the “use of all methods and procedures 
177. Id. at 1176.
178. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1335.
179. 16 U.S.C. §1540(g).
180. Id. §1532(13).
181. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 2004).
182. Wymyslo, supra note 133, at 55-59.
183. Id. at 59.
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which are necessary to bring any endangered spe-
cies or threatened species to the point at which 
the measures provided pursuant to this chapter 
are no longer necessary.”184 The current doctrine 
of standing under the ESA focuses on injuries 
to people, not to animals. But “[i]t is ‘beyond 
doubt that Congress intended endangered spe-
cies to be afforded the highest of priorities.’ This 
cannot occur until the legislature grants species 
standing.”185
Wymyslo makes a solid argument for standing 
under the ESA, which already has a citizen suit 
provision. Sunstein believes that Congress will 
soon grant standing to animals,186 but it may be 
more plausible that Congress will first add citi-
zen suit provisions to allow people to more eas-
ily establish standing under the statutes. What is 
clear is that congressional action is key to relax-
ing standing requirements for injuries to animals. 
To the extent some form of activism is required 
to effect the change, it may be Congress, not the 
courts, that should be the focus of the activity.
Personhood
Regardless of how much those litigating for 
animal welfare can learn from environmental 
protection lawsuits, perhaps the best hope for 
broadening standing in animal welfare cases is 
to give standing to the animals themselves. This 
is not an entirely implausible idea.187 Courts have 
already allowed animals as named plaintiffs, and 
the Ninth Circuit at least for a while left open 
the possibility that it had allowed standing to 
an animal.188 In Palila, the court simply stated 
that the Hawai’ian palila, a bird species, “has 
legal status and wings its way into federal court 
as a plaintiff in its own right.”189 Although subse-
quent cases used Palila as the basis for standing 
for other animals,190 that is actually a misread-
ing of the case. Since only one plaintiff has to 
have standing, there can be additional plaintiffs 
that do not have standing. As the court finally 
explained in Cetacean Community v. Bush, after 
requesting briefing, that language was dicta—
184. 16 U.S.C. §1532(3).
185. Wymyslo, supra note 133, at 60 (quoting Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of 
Land & Natural Res., 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1076 (D. Haw. 1986)).
186. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1359-60.
187. Id. at 1359-61.
188. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106 
(9th Cir. 1988).
189. Id. at 1107.
190. Marbled Murrelet (Brachyramphus marmoratus) v. Pacific Lumber 
Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (cited in Cetacean 
Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1173); Loggerhead, 896 F. Supp. at 1177 (also 
cited in Cetacean Cmty, 386 F.3d at 1173).
the litigation had been extensive and this was the 
court’s fourth opinion in the case; other parties 
had standing, and standing had never been an 
issue.191 The court stated that their statements 
were “little more than rhetorical flourishes.”192 
However, the fact that the court later requested 
briefing on its own language suggests it was at 
least willing to consider the legal merit of that 
language.
At the same time, the court did not immedi-
ately dismiss the idea of standing for animals. The 
only issue before the court in Cetacean Commu-
nity v. Bush was whether cetaceans had standing 
to sue in their own names under various federal 
statutes, including the ESA and MMPA.193 The 
court began its analysis with this statement: 
“Article III does not compel the conclusion that a 
statutorily authorized suit in the name of an ani-
mal is not a ‘case or controversy.’ As commenta-
tors have observed, nothing in the text of Article 
III explicitly limits the ability to bring a claim 
in federal court to humans.”194 The question the 
court analyzed then was whether Congress had 
passed a statute granting standing.195 After ana-
lyzing specific language in each of the statutes, 
the court determined that none granted stand-
ing to animals.196 Nevertheless, the statement 
that Article III itself does not preclude standing 
for animals remains. After having to explain its 
earlier “rhetorical flourishes,” the court could not 
have made that statement lightly.
But under Cetacean Community, animals do 
not have standing until Congress grants it to 
them. The Nonhuman Rights Project is working 
in the courts to change the common law doctrine 
that animals are not legal persons.197 Scholars 
191. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2004).
192. Id. at 1174.
193. Id. at 1171.
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 1176.
196. Id. at 1176-79.
197. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) tried another 
approach in Tilikum v. SeaWorld Parks & Ent., Inc., 842 F. Supp. 
2d 1259 (S.D. Cal. 2012). PETA argued that Tilikum and four 
other orcas used by SeaWorld were enslaved and should be freed 
under the Thirteenth Amendment. PETA did not claim person-
hood status for the orcas, but instead relied on the language of 
the Thirteenth Amendment that does not specify that it applies 
only to persons. The court held that the Thirteenth Amendment 
only applies to humans and in doing so denied standing because 
the plaintiffs’ injuries could not be redressed by the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 1264. However, one very short line of dicta at 
the end of the opinion recognizing that “the goal of Next Friends, 
in seeking to protect the welfare of orcas is laudable,” id., supports 
the contention that societal attitudes necessary to support the 
expansion of aesthetic injury to include moral considerations, 
and the expansion of public trust to include wildlife, are indeed 
changing.
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have explored this idea for many years and pos-
ited that at least some animals should be classified 
as legal persons and thereby have legal rights of 
their own.198 The Nonhuman Rights Project has 
filed the first cases seeking judicial recognition of 
legal personhood status for at least some animals. 
All four cases (in three courts) were habeas cor-
pus actions filed in New York State trial courts 
on behalf of individual chimpanzees.199 All three 
courts dismissed the cases200 on different grounds, 
but none closed the door. Instead, they included 
language suggesting they were sympathetic to 
the petitions.201 The intermediate appeals courts 
upheld the trial courts’ decisions, though one did 
so on alternate grounds and did not hold that 
animals are not legal persons.202 The Nonhuman 
Rights Project is appealing these cases further.203 
In a momentarily exciting twist, it appeared that 
a New York Supreme Court judge recognized two 
of the chimpanzees, Hercules and Leo, as legal 
persons when she granted their writ of habeas 
corpus and issued an order to show cause.204 
198. Emma A. Maddux, Comment, Time to Stand: Exploring the Past, 
Present, and Future of Nonhuman Animal Standing, 47 Wake Forest 
L. Rev. 1243, 1257-59 (2013); see, e.g., Steven M. Wise, Animal 
Thing to Animal Person: Thoughts on Time, Place and Theories, 5 
Animal L. 61 (1999).
199. Verified Petition, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Her-
cules & Leo v. Stanley, No. 32098/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk 
County 2013) (available at http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.
org/2013/12/10/legal-documents-re-hercules-and-leo/); Veri-
fied Petition, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. 
Lavery, No. 2051/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Fulton County 2013) 
(available at http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2013/12/02/
legal-documents-re-tommy-kiko-hercules-and-leo-2/); Verified 
Petition, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Kiko v. Presti, 
No. 151725/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Niagara County 2013) (avail-
able at http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2013/12/10/
legal-documents-re-kiko-the-chimpanzee/).
200. Press Release, Nonhuman Rights Project Advances to New York Ap-
pellate Courts in Three Chimpanzee Rights Cases, (Dec. 10, 2013), 
available at http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2013/12/10/
press-release-on-ny-judges-decisions/.
201. Id.
202. Memorandum and Order, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex 
rel. Kiko v. Presti, No. CA 14-00357 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 2, 
2015 (available at http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad4/Clerk/
Decisions/2015/01-02-15/PDF/1300.pdf ); Opinion and Order, 
New York ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project v. Lavery, No. 518336 
(N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 4, 2014) (available at http://decisions.courts.
state.ny.us/ad3/Decisions/2014/518336.pdf ); see Lawsuit Refiled 
on Behalf of Hercules and Leo, Nonhuman Rights Project (Mar. 
23, 2015), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2015/03/23/
lawsuit-re-filed-on-behalf-of-hercules-leo/.
203. In “Tommy” Case, NhRP Seeks Appeal to New York’s Highest Court, 
Nonhuman Rights Project, Dec. 18, 2014, http://www.non-
humanrightsproject.org/2014/12/18/in-tommy-case-nhrp-seeks-
appeal-to-new-yorks-highest-court/, NhRP Files Motion for Leave 
to Appeal to Court of Appeals in Kiko’s Case, Nonhuman Rights 
Project (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.
org/2015/04/20/nhrp-files-motion-for-leave-to-appeal-to-court-
of-appeals-in-kikos-case/.
204. Order to Show Cause and Writ of Habeas Corpus, Nonhuman 
Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules and Leo v. Stanley, No. 
Just hours later, however, the judge amended her 
order, striking the writ of habeas corpus and issu-
ing only the order to show cause.205 While these 
cases continue to make their way through the 
New York appeals courts, the Nonhuman Rights 
project also plans to file additional cases.206
The legal implications of personhood status 
for animals are far-reaching. Although standing 
would not be automatic, legal personhood would 
entirely change the analysis for some animals. 
For those animals, the conclusion in Cetacean 
Community v. Bush, based on animals not being 
persons as required by the citizen suit provisions, 
would be reversed. Even absent citizen suit provi-
sions, animals would no longer have to rely on 
what is essentially a third-person’s injury. Schol-
ars have contemplated the practical ramifications 
of personhood status and found standing not to 
be problematic given that we already use guard-
ians for humans who cannot press their own cases 
such as children and the disabled.207 Standing for 
at least some nonhumans would not be the pro-
cedural disaster that opponents fear.
But courts are not there yet.208 In the United 
States, only New York courts have had the 
152736/15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 20, 2015) (available at https://
iapps.courts.state.ny.us/fbem/DocumentDisplayServlet?docum
entId=4D9287VfBiI66TYZPi4P1w==&system=prod); Judge 
Recognizes Two Chimpanzees as Legal Persons, Grants Them Writ of 
Habeas Corpus, Nonhuman Rights Project (Apr. 20, 2015).
205. Amended Order to Show Cause, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. 
ex rel. Hercules and Leo v. Stanley, No. 152736/15 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Apr. 20, 2015) (available at http://www.nonhumanright-
sproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Amended-Order-to-
Show-Cause-Hercules-and-Leo.pdf ); Update on Hercules and 
Leo Order to Show Cause, Nonhuman Rights Project (Apr. 
21, 2015, http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2015/04/21/
update-on-hercules-and-leo-order-to-show-cause/.
206. Nonhuman Rights Project, About the Project, http://www.non-
humanrightsproject.org/about-the-project-2/ (last visited May 
3, 2015). To follow both the New York cases and any additional 
cases, see Nonhuman Rights Project, Court Cases, http://www.
nonhumanrightsproject.org/category/courtfilings/ (last visited 
May 14, 2015). This website contains both primary source court 
documents and news updates on Nonhuman Rights Project cases.
207. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1365.
208. In December 2014, worldwide news sources reported that a court 
in Argentina declared that an orangutan named Sandra was, as a 
non-human person, being held illegally. E.g., Court in Argentina 
Grants Basic Rights to Orangutan, BBC, Dec. 21, 2014, http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-30571577. However, once the 
decision was translated, it appeared that although the court said “[t]
hat based on a dynamic rather than static interpretation of the law, 
it is necessary to recognize the animal as a subject of rights, because 
nonhuman beings (animals) are entitled to rights, and therefore their 
protection is required by the corresponding jurisprudence,” it did 
not grant the habeas corpus petition, so Sandra’s status is unclear. 
Copy & Translation of Argentine Court Ruling, Nonhuman Rights 
Project, Dec. 23, 2014, http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.
org/2014/12/23/copy-of-argentine-court-ruling/. Previously, in 
2010, the “Helsinki Group” drafted the Declaration of Rights for 
Cetaceans: Whales and Dolphins, recognizing the personhood of 
all cetaceans. Helsinki Group, Declaration of Rights for Cetaceans: 
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opportunity to even consider legal personhood 
for animals, and only for chimpanzees.209 This is 
probably not the easiest way to gain standing for 
animals, but it would be the most concrete way 
to ensure somebody has standing in those cases 
in which, right now, standing is elusive.
Conclusion
Animals and the natural environment are in 
much the same position with respect to seeking 
redress for injury. Their own injury is not suffi-
cient and they have to rely on a corresponding 
human injury. Only if there is a human injury will 
anybody have standing to bring the lawsuit. Even 
then, establishing standing is not easy, nor are the 
requirements especially clear. Beyond the basic 
elements of injury, causation, and redressability, 
there seems to be much in the environmental 
standing doctrine (which includes animal stand-
ing cases) that is malleable or at least changeable. 
This leaves room for people seeking standing in 
animal cases to not only learn from the previous 
cases, but to argue to extend them. However, the 
best hope may not be in judicial decisions regard-
ing standing but in congressional grant of stand-
ing to either persons or animals through citizen 
suit provisions. Citizen suit provisions have made 
it easier for environmental plaintiffs to establish 
standing, but they are mostly still nonexistent for 
animal plaintiffs. A further hope lies in an idea 
that is not open to environmental elements: the 
idea of personhood for at least some animals. As 
sentient beings, animals may one day have direct 
access to the courts when they are injured.
The aspect of a changed legal status for ani-
mals may be relatively new, but Justice Douglas 
eloquently answered Professor Stone’s question 
and foreshadowed the idea that natural objects, 
including animals, should have standing. He 
stated:
Whales and Dolphins http://www.cetaceanrights.org/ (last visited 
May 3, 2015) (cited in Maddux, supra note 198, at 1265).
209. This is not just an issue for U.S. courts. Beginning in 2007, a 
case seeking legal personhood status for Mathew Hiasl Pan, a 
chimpanzee, made its way through the Austrian court system until 
the Austrian Supreme Court finally turned down the final appeal, 
partially on the grounds that the applicant did not have standing. 
A case was then filed in the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR). Martin Balluch & Eberhart Theurer, Personhood Trial 
for Chimpanzee Mathew Pan, Verein Gegen Tierfabriken, n.d., 
https://www.vgt.at/publikationen/texte/artikel/20080118Hiasl.
htm. However, the outcome of the ECHR case is unclear. The 
Spanish Parliament in 2008 passed a resolution granting legal 
rights to great apes. Lee Glendinning, Spanish Parliament Approves 
Human Rights for Great Apes, The Guardian, June 26, 2008, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/26/humanrights.
animalwelfare.
Perhaps they will not win. Perhaps the bulldoz-
ers of “progress” will plow under all the aesthetic 
wonders of this beautiful land. That is not the 
present question. The sole question is, who has 
standing to be heard? Those who hike the Appa-
lachian Trail into Sunfish Pond, New Jersey, 
and camp or sleep there, or run the Allagash in 
Maine, or climb the Guadalupes in West Texas, 
or who canoe and portage the Quetico Superior 
in Minnesota, certainly should have standing 
to defend those natural wonders before courts 
or agencies, though they live 3,000 miles away. 
Those who merely are caught up in environ-
mental news or propaganda and flock to defend 
these waters or areas may be treated differently. 
That is why these environmental issues should 
be tendered by the inanimate object itself. Then 
there will be assurances that all of the forms 
of life which it represents will stand before the 
court—the pileated woodpecker as well as the 
coyote and bear, the lemmings as well as the 
trout in the streams. Those inarticulate mem-
bers of the ecological group cannot speak. But 
those people who have so frequented the place 
as to know its values and wonders will be able 
to speak for the entire ecological community.210
Unfortunately, Justice Douglas was writing 
for the dissent. Looking into the future, the per-
sonhood movement might achieve standing for 
animals. For now, the interests of animals, like 
those of other environmental elements, can only 
be litigated by people who can establish standing.
210. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 751-52 (1972) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
